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Abstract  
This paper presents results on mass customization of wireless communications services 
and tariffs. It advocates for a user-centric view of wireless service configuration and 
pricing as opposed to present-day service catalog options. The focus is on design 
methodology and tools for such individual services and tariffs, using altogether 
information compression, negotiation algorithms, and risk portfolio analysis. We first 
analyze the user and supplier needs and aspirations. We then introduce the systematic 
design-oriented approach which can be applied. The implications of this approach for 
users and suppliers are discussed based on an end-user survey and on model-based 
calculations. It is shown that users can achieve desired service bundle cost reduction, 
while suppliers can improve significantly their risk-profit equilibrium points, reduce 
churn and simplify provisioning. 
 
Keywords: mobile communication services, mass customization, individual tariffs, 
negotiation, service configuration   
 
1. Introduction   
 
This paper presents the progress and challenges of the research and needed 
support tools in mass customization of mobile/wireless communication services.    
Recent research in mass customization has primarily focused on the customization 
of physical products such as clothing (e.g. footwear, garments, prêt à porter), consumer 
electronics (e.g. watches, laptops), etc., and on user design toolkits for such 
customizations (Abou-Jaoude & Kung, 2005; Au & Goonetilleke, 2005; Franke & Pille, 
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2004; Ogawa & Piller, 2006; von Hippel, 2005). Services differ from physical goods in 
their intangibility, perishability, heterogeneity and in the inseparability of production 
from consumption (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). Mass customization of 
services is rather limited and applications are widely spread across different industries 
such as education, finance, health care, etc.; the corresponding research publications have 
focused on mass customization strategy (Gabriel, Gersch, & Weber, 2006; Grenci & 
Watts, 2007; Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996), customization frameworks, processes and 
customization approaches under specific contexts (Huang & Lin, 2005; Winter, 2001), 
and customer value perception (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004).    
Current practices of mass customization in the mobile communication industry 
mainly focus on the industrial design of the wireless terminals, on user interfaces and 
sometimes on software based feature selection; see e.g. Sigala (2006) for customers’ 
perceived value dimensions (e.g. functional, social, and emotional) of mass customized 
“mobile phone + services” and implications for suppliers in conducting a customer value-
based market segmentation. Some mobile terminal suppliers have made mass 
customization of their designs their key intellectual property rights (IPR) based business 
model. This is accomplished via common design platforms that help third parties produce 
competing customized products (e.g. Ericsson Mobile Platforms AB, Modelabs, 
Qualcomm). 
With regard to public mobile services which involve the network infrastructure 
for the production of such services, mass customization remains limited despite mobile 
users numbering in excess of 2 Billion. Public operators usually offer 5-10 generic 
service bundles which are sold “unmodified” to anyone and include only basic service 
functions that most customers are expected to use, such as voice communication, SMS; 
each bundle corresponds to a set of tariffs. User chooses a bundle, signs a contract 
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(usually for 1 or 2 years) and pays a fixed monthly fee, which may cover a maximum 
usage of voice minutes, SMS, MMS or a certain amount of data traffic, plus limited 
customer support and wireless terminal amortization. Costs for usage exceeding the 
default service usage limits vary among bundles. There is no interaction between the 
supplier and the user, other than when a user is choosing from a supplier’s defined 
catalog of services. Different suppliers offer almost the same bundles except for prices, 
support functions and upgrades. Personalization of the services is limited to a few 
discrete user choices relating to the same bundles.   
2. Scope of the paper 
 
This paper and other related one’s (Chen & Pau, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Pau 
& Chen, 2006), advocate for a much bolder user-centric view of wireless service 
configuration and pricing. The goal is to let all users who wish to manage service and 
content access themselves, define which functions, content and price they will accept, 
waiting for competing suppliers to bid for it. Once a supplier has been chosen and has 
accepted, he must provide such a mass customized bundle for a duration chosen by the 
user. 
Obviously not all users want to take this customization into their own hands, in 
that many will just be happy with the generic catalog bundles and the lack of 
transparency attached to the provisioning costs and quality of service (QoS) of such 
generic bundles. 
Thus the real challenge behind mass customization of mobile communication 
service and content bundles is, akin to general governance concepts, how much the user 
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as a stakeholder needs to know, and how much the supplier is willing to reveal, about the 
infrastructure characteristics and operations. 
A second challenge is to establish how the laws of large numbers can actually 
benefit the supplier who is willing to offer individual bundles and tariffs, by increasing 
user loyalty over time, enhancing the service demands, and reducing the financial and 
operational risks.  
Thus this paper systematically analyzes the user and supplier needs and 
aspirations, benefits and risks, as a result of a proposed negotiation process supported by 
the corresponding tools. The implications of mass customization of mobile services are 
studied both via user surveys and via quantitative tools. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 analyzes user and supplier needs and 
expectation from mass customized mobile services; Section 4 summarizes the progress of 
a series of research we have conducted under the title “individual tariffs”, which provide 
methodology and models to design mass customized wireless services and tariffs; Section 
5 discusses the implications of individual services and tariffs for both the users and the 
suppliers; the analysis is based both on the results of a survey and on model based 
calculations; Section 6 discusses the open research issues; Section 7 concludes the paper.   
3. User and supplier needs and expectations from mass customized 
mobile services 
 
3.1. User needs and expectations  
As mobile wireless becomes the dominant communications access technology 
worldwide, mobile services, especially value added services are growing in an explosive 
manner. User’s needs and expectations from mobile services are changing. According to 
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a worldwide survey conducted by the Rotterdam School of Management (Chen & Pau, 
2007c): 
- Users are demanding specific service bundles that meet their unique demands; 
there is a wide variety of needs but also significant overlap (in terms of proposed 
applications and services) amongst individual users; 
- Users want to reduce cost and simplify their service bundles when given the 
opportunity to personalize their service bundles and tariffs. This is reflected in the 
answers of 51% of the respondents who consider personalized service bundles 
and tariffs to be a cost reduction feature; while the rest consider it as a life style 
feature (28%) and productivity feature (10%). Regarding the pricing, 47% of the 
respondents would pay less than 50% of the original price when the number of 
service features in the service bundle is reduced by 50%; 40% of the respondents 
will pay exactly half; and 13% of the respondents are willing to pay more than 
half;   
- Users are demanding greater flexibility in contract length. The average ideal 
contract length is 6.8 month when the respondents can define the contract length 
themselves;  
- Users are willing to spend time on personalizing a service. The majority of the 
respondents chose 30 minutes (22%) and 1 hour (41%). 
3.2. Supplier needs and expectations 
At the same time, the public suppliers in the mobile communications industry are 
facing:   
- A continuously increased competition which was brought about by deregulation, 
privatization and liberalization (Geddes, 2000; Noam, 1983; Pau, 2002; Xu & Pitt, 
2002); the competition is both technological, in that e.g. fixed telephony is 
 7 
decreasing in proportion vs. other access technologies, as well as market based in 
that marketing and price pressure have major impacts while the number of 
suppliers increases;   
- A fundamental layering introduced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) consisting of access networks, transport networks, and service layers, so 
that one given supplier may not have to own and operate all three with the related 
huge complexities;     
- Largely saturated markets for wireless communications in early adopter 
geographical zones,  with huge marketing costs,  high churn rates and high 
customer retention costs as pitfalls  (Wieland, 2006) 
- A technology and customer push for converged services; here the meaning of 
convergence is two fold: the convergence amongst various access technologies 
(2G, 2.5G, 3G, B3G, WiMax, fixed) and the convergence of access, content and 
applications; 
- High pressure on overstaffed incumbent operators to reduce operational processes 
and costs, even outsourcing many wireless service operations to systems suppliers 
or integrators;  
- Insufficient investments in service creation, commoditization of key infrastructure 
elements, in content access rights, etc …    
The segmentation of mobile services into limited generic bundles can no longer 
satisfy the needed actions from the above trends, as they fundamentally have diminishing 
returns from ever increasing provisioning complexities. It is high time that user-centric 
mass customization, with user-supplier interactions, is introduced in mobile 
communication services; it will fundamentally allow the suppliers to achieve a higher 
granularity of their service and access components and thus finally to clinch more stable 
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revenues from managed services rather than from managing network capacity exposed to 
user churn. 
4. Modeling the user, the supplier and their interactions in the context 
of mass customized mobile services and tariffs  
 
4.1. Individual services and tariffs  
Under the context of mass customization of mobile services, we define individual 
service and tariffs as the regulatory protected ability for an identified user to obtain from 
a service provider, by a bilateral specific contract, a set of service and related content 
specific prices corresponding to a user request specified with a service demand profile 
and some duration. In short, the user will have tariffs unique to him depending on the 
services he requires in terms of quality and quantity. 
The research on individual bundles and tariffs can be divided into three major 
areas:  
1.) The study of users from the perspective of mass customized consumer behavior in 
services (different from products) (Chen & Pau, 2006). 
2.) The study of suppliers exposed to mass customized services and tariffs which 
focus on service and content bundling models, service provisioning, and on churn 
reduction problems (Chen & Pau, 2006, 2007a; Pau & Chen, 2006). 
3.) The study of the interactions between a user and a supplier for individual service 
bundles and prices. The focus is on negotiation models, with all refinements 
including risk analysis; and on the operational environment for the deployment of 
such models in view of the large number of negotiations (Chen & Pau, 2006,  
2007a, 2007b; Pau & Chen, 2006).  
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We take a utilitarian approach when modeling the users and the suppliers. 
4.2. Modelling the users 
The user, instead of being fully rational, has “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957). 
He tries to optimize his utility but in a simple way. We propose that the user builds his 
utility function based on a set of “perceived attributes” of a mobile service. The 
“perceived attributes” are a reduced, e.g. 3 dimensional mapping of the e.g. 20+ service 
attributes defined by the service provider using full technical specifications in the 
“service design space”. The mapping is determined by either user surveys, previous 
customer information, and/or actual service usage as communications networks offer 
unique self-monitoring capabilities not found in other application areas for mass 
customization. We introduced a computational method to design such service specific 
perceived attributes, using principal component analysis adapted in a specific way (Pau & 
Chen, 2006).  
In the reduced “perceptual space” constructed by the perceived attributes, the 
user’s utility function is defined as the Euclidian distance between a point ideal to him 
(target point) and the supplier’s service bundle offer. The user maximizes his utility by 
minimizing the distance, subject to his social and economic constraints. He uses 
satisficing rules in decision making.       
4.3. Modelling the supplier(s) 
The supplier is considered to be a profit maximizing firm, with detailed modeling 
of an incremental customer’s usage of infrastructure, content, management and other 
resources. The supplier makes decisions in the “service design space”. His decision 
variables are primarily related to parameters of the technical specifications and 
configuration of a service (e.g. parameters related to QoS); these technical details are 
often beyond the interests or understanding of an ordinary user. The supplier’s utility 
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function is defined as the incremental profit from serving the demand of an additional 
user, which is the user’s bid price minus all non-financial costs corresponding to the user-
requested customized service and content characteristics. The utility function of a 
supplier and the applicable constraints and configuration options can be very complex; it 
has a lot non-linearities due to the underlying cost items and technology jumps involved 
in providing the service (Chen & Pau, 2007a).   
4.4 The interaction between individual users and a supplier around individual 
tariffs and bundles  
The service personalization and tariff negotiation processes can be modeled by 
different multi-stage non-cooperative games (Chen & Pau, 2006; Pau & Chen, 2006). 
The user and supplier exchange technical, service and price attributes of a mobile service 
bundle as requested initially by the user, in a “service design space”. They take turns to 
optimize with constraints their own utilities in each stage of the game. We define an 
equilibrium as a situation in which both the user and the supplier are satisfied with the 
negotiation result and agree to sign a contract. Stackelberg games are introduced when 
the user and the supplier have different bargaining power; the leader has the advantage of 
moving first. It can be a 1-on-1 or 1-on-N game when the supplier is negotiating with one 
individual user or a user community (Chen & Pau, 2007a; Pau & Chen, 2006).  
In practice, such a Stackelberg equilibrium determination cannot obviously be 
carried out for any user with any supplier. But each operator will normally have all the 
information needed as well as the computation power to generate, e.g. in look-up table 
format most of the equilibrium cases, or non-contract cases, to be expected in a given 
market.  
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4.5. Risk analysis  
As they are driven by mass diversity in needs and willingness to pay, the user-
specific service bundles and tariffs bring uncertainty to the supplier’s profit: some of 
them generate profits; others may bring losses. This uncertainty can be reduced if the 
supplier pools together a large group of users whose preferences follow certain 
distributions. Note that revenue assurance techniques inspired from the insurance 
industry can be developed and used. In our research, we apply such statistical methods 
and techniques in analyzing the consequences and implications when the supplier is 
offering certain services to specific groups. For example, in the numerical case we 
designed (see Section 5 for details), we calculated the expected profit, value at risk (VaR) 
and percentage of contracted equilibria using the Monte Carlo method; the basic 
assumption is that a random user has consistent characteristics to a surveyed group. Such 
analysis is necessary to give the supplier basic business guarantees to enter individual 
tariff agreements. Furthermore, the supplier can adjust the parameters in the decision 
rules which are used in the negotiation; the adjustment can be based on profit vs. risk 
from the obtained risk statistics (Chen & Pau, 2007a). If the supplier has a risk adverse 
profile, the above calculations produce estimates of the proportion of potential customers 
that no contracts will be signed with because such customers might have requests that 
represent the risky service bundles or usage profiles; in such a case, laws of competition 
should allow such users to find a competing supplier with a different risk profile. 
5.  Implications for users and supplier   
 
Section 4 provided a systematic design-oriented approach regarding “how to 
achieve mass customized individual service bundles and tariffs”. In this section, we give 
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estimations of the implications, benefits and costs, when the users and the supplier 
commit to individual services and tariffs. These estimates are based both on the end-user 
survey reported in (Chen & Pau, 2007c), and on model based equilibrium and risk 
calculations (as explained in Section 4 ):  
- There were 13 questions in the survey; each focused on different aspect of user 
preferences regarding individual tariffs. The questions were also chosen in such a 
way that by nesting them, some estimates of key implicit indicators could be 
computed. Overall there were 102 respondents worldwide; the majority of them 
were end-users and researchers.   
- With respect to the model-based calculations, we use a quasi-realistic operator 
model with non-linear wireless technology provisioning options, as well as user 
utility determinations from a survey group of 600 persons. Furthermore the model 
calculations include full Monte Carlo simulation, value at risk determination and 
realistic discretized decision variables on service attributes.    
Total traffic change 
Total traffic change can be estimated as the joint effect of the changes in 
communication patterns and changes in the number of service bundle features due to 
personalized configurations.  
Changes in communication patterns are measured in the number of contacts, 
communication frequency and duration. The survey shows that about one-third of the 
respondents will not change their current behavior; about 60% of the respondents 
consider a slight increase up to 50%. On average, the increases will be 16% (number of 
contacts), 20% (communication frequency) and 34% (communication duration). These 
increases will lead to increased service bundle usage and network traffic demands. If we 
assume network traffic changes linearly with the changes in communication patterns, 
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Ceteris paribus, then the increases in the number of contacts, communication frequency 
and communication duration will lead to an increase in the network traffic demand of:  
(1+ 16%) * (1+20%) * (1+34%). i.e. 187%. 
On the other hand, personalization with service design put eventually in the hands 
of the users allows simplification of the services. If we assume the amount of network 
traffic is proportional to the number of features of the personalized service configuration, 
simplification could lead to a decrease in network traffic. The survey result indicates that 
70% of the respondents considered a personalized service should be simpler when 
compared to a complete version of the service bundle; 20% respondents would keep it 
unchanged and 10% wanted more features. The expected change in the number of service 
features can be calculated from the weight of each group. We assess three scenarios, 
where the expected changes in the number of service features in the personalized service 
bundle are low, medium and high; see Table 1 (Here 25% means that the personalized 
service configuration will keep 25% of the features of the original service, 100% means 
unchanged, 175% means the personalized service configuration will add 75% more 
features to the original service bundle.) As it is shown in Table 1, in the low scenario, the 
result of personalized service configurations is a reduction of 50% of the original service 
bundle features.  
Table 1: Different scenarios regarding the number of service bundle features and traffic 
change 
 Relative changes in the number 
of service design features 
Scenarios Low Medium High 
Respondents want simplification (70%) 25% 50% 75% 
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Respondents want to keep service design unchanged 
(20%) 
100% 100% 100% 
Respondents want more features (10%) 125% 150% 175% 
Expected change in the number of service bundle 
features  
50% 70%  90% 
 
Given the above estimations, the total traffic change can be estimated under 
different scenarios. In the low scenario, the total amount of network traffic will decrease 
about 7%. In the other two scenarios, there will be a growth in network traffic. See Table 
2. 
Table 2: Total traffic changes under different scenarios  
Scenarios Low Medium High 
Traffic changes due to changes in communication patterns  187 % 
Traffic changes due to changes in the number of features after 
service design personalization  
50% 70% 90% 
Total change in network traffic 93%  131% 168% 
 
If we assign a probability to the each of the scenarios from Table 1, i.e. low (0.3), 
medium (0.4) and high (0.3), the expected network traffic will be 131%, which is a 31% 
increase from the previous situation which does not allow service design configuration 
and no individual tariffs.      
Churn rate 
Churn rate is defined as the percentage of subscribers who leave the contractual 
relationship with one supplier during a given period (e.g. 1 month). “Net churn” measures 
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the overall loss of subscribers, while “Gross churn” measures the absolute loss. Net churn 
(%)=[Gross churn (%)-New contracts (%)] (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Churn_rate). 
Here we only consider “Gross churn”. 
By allowing flexibility in the length of individual service bundle contracts, the supplier 
may have a shortened average contract length from the users compared to current 
dominant 12 or 24 months terms (with or without new mobile terminal). On one hand, it 
becomes easier for the users to switch network operators. But on the other hand, 
personalization can greatly improve user satisfaction, which in turn will reduce churn. 
This could mean that more users would like to prolong or renew the contracts with the 
same supplier of an individual service bundle when the previous contract expires.  
According to Wireless Intelligence (Wieland, 2006), and spot data from wireless 
operators worldwide, the churn rate for mobile subscribers or prepaid users usually falls 
in the interval 1.5% - 3%/month, with operator, bundle and country specifics. We 
estimate the gross churn rates under two scenarios -- 1.5 % and 3 % monthly churn rates; 
see Table 3. The corresponding yearly gross churns are calculated for reference purposes. 
Using the result from the survey which indicated an average individual tariff contract 
length of 6.8 months, the 7 month gross churn rate (rounded up from 6.8) can be 
calculated.  
These data can serve as indicators for individual tariffs: by introducing mass 
customized service personalization for service and content bundles, and individual tariffs, 
the users accepting such a contract would NOT churn within 7 months. This means that 
for that sub-category of users, churn rate is certainly less than 10.4 % under a low churn 
rate scenario for all users, and less than 19.2 % under a high churn rate scenario for all 
users.     
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Table 3: Churn rate estimations 
 Scenario low churn Scenario high churn 
Monthly gross churn rate 1.5% 3% 
Yearly gross churn rate 16.59% 30.62% 
7 months gross churn 10.04% 19.20% 
 
Changes in “price/bit” 
Changes in price per bit can be approximated by the following formula around a 
given point:     
Derivative (price/bit)=[d(price)*bit – price * d(bit) ] /bit2 = d(price)/bit -  price*d(bit)/bit2 
Consider the scenario that as a result of the personalization of the service bundle 
configuration, the number of service features is reduced to 50% of the complete version 
of service and content bundle. According to the processed answers from the survey, the 
expected price the user is willing to pay will change to 0.4450 of the original price (of the 
complete version). The traffic under this (low) scenario will change to 93% (see Table 2) 
of the original service and content bundle traffic. A rough estimation of the changes in 
(price/bit) ratio by compounded derivatives is:  
[(-0.5550*price/bit –price* (-0.0643)bit/bit2 = - 0.4907* (price/bit)].  
Thus price/bit is decreasing by almost half in this scenario to the benefit of the 
user if individual tariffs are adopted.   
Service configuration & tariff negotiation 
From the survey, 23% of the respondents will pay less when they are offered to do 
the service design personalization themselves, as compared to the same service design 
managed by the operator. Suppliers can earn extra revenue by offering service 
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configuration assistance for this group of subscribers. About half of the respondents 
would like to be actively involved in service configuration and tariff negotiation. The 
high willingness to spend about 1 hour on self-configuration shows eagerness to 
differentiate and save if cost savings can be generated and/or or unique service features 
can be chosen. Suppliers can also save costs from those who configure services for 
themselves.  
User and supplier benefits and risks from a case with quantitative analysis  
1.) The case:  we designed a service bundle in the mobile music area (see details in 
(Pan & Chen, 2006) and applied the above mentioned methods and models for 
service personalization and tariff negotiation. We developed a tool to automate 
the negotiation process for services and tariffs, along with the risk assessment.  
2.) User benefits: our numerical results on that case show that users achieve a 370 % 
gain in their utilities in the mass customized mode compared to the initial utilities 
derived from the selection of a sufficient generic service bundle. Figure 1 
illustrates the negotiation between a user and a supplier modeled by the proposed 
Stackelberg game part of the toolset. The circles represent the user’s requests and 
the crosses represent the supplier’s counter proposals; the conclusive negotiation 
outcome is shown by point “Stakelberg EQ”. The coordinates of each point 
represent the utilities of the user and the supplier. The user achieves a much better 
result when compared to the non-negotiable tariff illustrated by point “public 
offer” in the Figure 1. For the complete numerical case, see Chen & Pau(2007a) 
and  Pau & Chen (2006).   
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Figure 1: The negotiation process between a user and a supplier in the mobile music 
case  
3.) Supplier benefits: at the same time, the supplier is able to adjust parameters to 
achieve a higher profit than with non-negotiable tariffs according to the risk he is 
willing to take. Figure 2(a), (b), (c) give a simplified illustration on how the 
adjustment of the parameter “minimum profit threshold” affects the percentage of 
contracted equilibria, the expected profit and the VaR. The effects of the 
adjustment of this parameter “minimum profit threshold” on the supplier’s total 
expected profit and total risk are shown in Figure 2(d). An optimal solution where 
the supplier can achieve maximum profit with minimum risk may not exist. The 
supplier must then base his decision on an equilibrium compromise between the 
total risk he is willing to take and the total expected profit corresponding to that 
revenue. In practice, the shape of the curves can be much more complex, see 
(Chen & Pau, 2007a; Pau & Chen, 2006) for further details. 
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Figure 2: Supplier can adjust the parameter “Minimum profit threshold” to achieve 
different results. 
Using the same tools, we are looking into the mass customization of a generic 
service bundle but with an emphasis on only very basic service elements such as voice 
usage, SMS usage, contract price and contract duration. This means that end users can 
freely negotiate the personal usage of a catalog generic service.  The fact that such a case 
can readily be investigated shows the power of the tool.     
Summary  
To summarize, mass customized wireless individual services and tariffs can help 
the users reduce cost, which is the main concern of more than half of the respondents to 
the user survey. For the supplier, individual services and tariffs may lead to an increase in 
traffic demand but with less complexity in over- or under-provisioning. Furthermore, 
individual tariffs offer the supplier flexibility to achieve better control of their goals in 
terms of market share, profit level and risks by a portfolio approach. Additionally, the 
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supplier can benefit from extra revenues and reduced costs by helping, as an additional 
cost on top of the bundle, users who cannot themselves configure their individual service 
attributes. Regarding the churn rate, only the upper limit can be estimated, and it shows a 
significant reduction vs. present churn for generic services; the actual churn rate should 
be even lower because of the improved customer satisfaction and loyalty.  
6. Open research issues 
 
Mass customization support tool  
The users want to be passively or actively involved in service personalization and 
tariff negotiation, but in all cases it is necessary for the supplier to have a set of tools to 
automate the process (see Section 5 above). A tool should function either in a simplified 
mode without much involvement by the users (e.g. users only provide simple service 
feature, price and contract duration wishes) or in an interactive mode where users actively 
participate in the service design personalization and negotiation. Furthermore, the tools 
should all provide risk assessments for the supplier when selecting different negotiation 
parameters and decision criteria. We have developed and implemented a prototype of 
such tool (Pau & Chen, 2006) but it is not yet complete. The open issues are: 
- how to implement the tool in a complex operational environment coupled to the 
OSS and rating engines;  
- how to integrate the tool seamlessly into the supplier’s service provisioning  
infrastructure; 
- how to provide customer support to users of the mass customized service bundle 
once contracted. 
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User behavior 
From the survey result, still half of the respondents prefer a flat rate for all the 
services; it will be valuable to find out the main reason behind the preference.  
We have done some basic research regarding the “simplification” concerns of the 
users when they do not select a flat rate. The solution is a “service design space” for the 
supplier and a “perceptual space” for the user, the latter being a reduced mapping of the 
former (Pau & Chen, 2006). However, there is no immediate solution for what should be 
included in the design elements so that the perceived attributes of a service meet the 
user’s demands.  
The perception of individual services and tariffs as a cost reduction / life style / 
productivity improvement feature implies different user behaviors during the service 
configuration and tariff negotiation process. Our previous study used a coarse method by 
assuming all the users have a similar form of utility function, or that their preferences 
belong to a common utility distribution  (Chen & Pau, 2006). Further research can be 
done by identifying different utility functions for different categories of users. 
Churn 
Given the averaged ideal contract length for a mass customized service bundle 
and  individual tariff (i.e. about 7 months), what still needs to be investigated is the 
specific churn rate for users of such individual services and tariffs alone, once 
compounded back to a monthly churn rate for such users, over a number of cycles of 
individual tariff contracts. This analysis should clarify how much smaller the specific 
churn rates would be for these specific users than the observed ones under the two 
scenarios in Section 5. Some early reports from industry (Wieland, 2006) show that by 
allowing very preliminary levels of personalization, operators can already greatly reduce 
churn.  
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Risk 
There are a lot of distribution uncertainties to be addressed when using individual 
tariffs: 
- uncertainty that comes from user preferences; 
- uncertainty that comes from user characteristics, which are hidden and driven by 
social issues such as affordability; 
- uncertainty that comes from the supplier’s service provisioning cost model due to 
lack of data and technical system failures. 
Classic statistical analysis such as value at risk (VaR) may not provide good estimate of 
events with small probabilities but big impacts. Currently, we are trying to embed 
extreme value theory into the tools, which may safeguard the supplier from such risks.     
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper contributes to the research about mass customization of services by 
introducing the methods and models which can be applied in the mass customization of 
mobile communications services and tariffs.  
The model-based quantitative analyses show that the adoption of personalized 
service bundles and tariffs can be beneficial to both the users and the suppliers. As the 
end-user survey has already indicated that there is a critical mass of the population who 
are willing to adopt mass customized services and tariffs, it is up to the suppliers to take 
the challenges to bring it into reality. In consequence when mobile operators will offer 
better responsiveness to their customers in terms of operations transparency, as well as 
governance to them as stakeholders, the sustainable financial performance of these 
operators will gain from mass customized service bundles and tariffs.         
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